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FEDERAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEEDINGS-UNITED STATES ACCEPTANCE
OF INTERNATIONAL CoURT OF JUSTICE COMPULSORY JurusDICTION-In October
1957 Switzerland, on behalf of the holding company now commonly known
as Interhandel,1 addressed an application against the United States to the
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.). Claiming I.C.J. jurisdiction by
reason of the United States adherence to article 36 (2) of the Statute of the
Court,2 Switzerland's submissions were essentially that the United States
was under an obligation (I) to restore to Interhandel assets of the General
Aniline and Film Corp.s which had been seized in 1942 pursuant to the
Trading with the Enemy Act,4 and, as an alternative, (2) to submit the

1 Originally called I. G. Chemie, now Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales S.A. (hereafter referred to as Societe Internationale), "Interhandel"
is entered in the common registry of the Canton of Basie, Switzerland. Societe Internationale v. McGranery, (D.C. D.C. 1953) 111 F. Supp. 435.
2 Art. 36 (2) provides: "The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare
that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation
to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal
disputes concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international
law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation; d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation." For the United States adherence, see Declaration
of the United States of America of August 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598.
3 GAF, a Delaware corporation, was founded in 1939 as American I.C. Chemical Corp.
by merger of Agfa-Ansco Corp., General Aniline Works, and Ozalid Corp. In general see
Buttler, "General Aniline Nears the Block," N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 1956, p. 29:1. From
its inception GAF was almost wholly owned by Interhandel. Mason, "The General Aniline
and Film Co. Case," PROCEEDINGS OF nm AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 114
at 114-117 (1958).
4 The act provides for the vesting of title to enemy owned assets in the Alien Property
Custodian. 40 Stat. 411 (1917), as amended by the Fust War Powers Act of 1941, 55 Stat.
839 (1941), 50 U.S.C. Appx. (1952) §5 (b).
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dispufe to arbitration.5 The United States countered with four preliminary objections to jurisdiction.6 Most important were objections 3, that
" ... Interhandel ... has not exhausted the local remedies available to it
in the United States courts," and 4 (a), that the "sale or disposition [of
GAF assets] has been determined by the United States of America, pursuant
to paragraph (b) of the Conditions attached to this country's acceptance
of this Court's jurisdiction [the automatic reservation],7 to be a matter
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of this country." By order of
October 24, 1957, the court rejected, for lack of urgency, Switzerland's
request to indicate interim measures.8 On March 21, 1959, the court
rendered judgment on the preliminary objections. By a nine-judge majority, held, the application is inadmissible for failure to exhaust local
remedies. Ten judges found it unnecessary to adjudicate upon objection
4 (a), observing that the objection was made only with regard to disposition
of the vested assets, and that the United States had not yet determined to
make such disposition. Interhandel Case (Preliminary), [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 6.
On October 21, 1948, Interhandel filed an action in the District Court
for the District of Columbia9 seeking restoration of its vested assets on the
ground that at the time of seizure it was not an enemy or ally of an enemy.
Although a Swiss company, Interhandel apparently had been formed by
I. G. Farben, a German chemical trust.10 The crux of the dispute was
whether German ownership terminated prior to the United States' declaration of war upon Germany in 1941. In the district court the parties moved
for discovery.11 On July 5, 1949, Interhandel was ordered to produce the
bank records of H. Sturzenegger & Cie.12 On June 15, 1950, two weeks
before the St1:rzenegger records were to be produced, the Swiss Federal
Principal case at 19.
Id. at 10-11.
7 "PROVIDED, that this declaration shall not apply to .•. (b) Disputes with regard to
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of
America as determined by the United States of America.•.." Declaration of the United
States of America of August 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598.
s Interhandel Case (Interim), [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 105.
9 As provided for by the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411 (1917), as amended
by the First War Powers Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 839 (1941), 50 U.S.C. Appx. (1952) §9 (a).
10 E.g., Interhandel's first president, Hermann Schmitz, also first president of American
I.G. Chemical Corp., was chairman of the Board of I. G. Farben. Interhandel's original
stock was issued on behalf of Ed. Greutert &: Cie., predecessor of H. Sturzenegger &: Cie.,
a private Swiss banking concern purportedly financed by I. G. Farben. Mason, "The General Aniline and Film Co. Case," PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SocmrY OF INTERNATIONAL
LA.w 114 at 115 (1958).
11 Pursuant to Rule 34, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1958).
12 Societe Internationale v. Clark, (D.C. D.C. 1949) 9 F.R.D. 263. I. G. Farben is said
to have controlled Interhandel, by a system of options, pledges and loans, through the
so-called "Sturzenegger Circle." In 1940 the control system was at least nominally terminated. Whether effective control was relinquished probably cannot be discovered without
examination of the records of H. Sturzenegger &: Cie. Mason, "The General Aniline and
Film Co. Case," PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 114 at 116
(1958). "The inference is plain that an investigation of I. G. Chemie is necessarily an
investigation of H. Sturzenegger &: Cie." Societe Internationale v. McGranery, note 1 supra,
at 441.
5

6
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Attorney constructively seized them through the exercise of a preventive
police power, considering that submission would constitute violation of
article 47 of the Swiss Bank Law1 3 and article 273 of the Swiss Penal
Code.H The court then appointed a special master, who found, inter
alia, that Interhandel had made a good faith effort to obtain the ordered
documents, that there was no evidence of collusion between plaintiff and
the Swiss Government, and that "there was a substantial legal basis for the
seizure under Swiss law."1 5 The court itself, after adopting the master's
report, found "that the ... papers were and are in the possession . . . of
plaintiff and that except for their confiscation ... plaintiff would be able
to produce them."16 However, considering that to hold otherwise "would
permit a foreign party to be placed in a favored position by the laws or
action of his government,"17 the court then held that plaintiff "refused"18
to comply with a production order, and that dismissal with prejudice was
proper.19 After considerable delay the court of appeals made a final affirmance.20 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed,21
holding that because of "serious constitutional questions" of due process,
dismissal was inappropriate.22 The case was remanded with instructions
to require additional evidence of good faith, "explore plans looking towards fuller compliance," or proceed to trial on the merits.
Switzerland's application to the I.C.J. was based upon the U.S.-Swiss
Washington Accord.23 That agreement provided that Switzerland would
liquidate German assets within her jurisdiction. The Swiss Compensation
Office was charged with liquidation, and its decisions were subject to appeal
by an Allied Joint Commission to the Swiss Review Authority. The Accord also stipulated that "the United States will unblock Swiss assets in the
United States."24 In February 1946 the Swiss Compensation Office determined that Interhandel was a Swiss company.25 The Joint Commission
indicated disagreement. On January 5, 1948, the Review Authority an13 The provision provides for banking secrecy.
14 This article creates the crime of "economic espionage."
15 Societe Internationale v. McGranery, note I supra, at 439.
16 Id. at 442.
11 Id. at 443.

1s Within Rule 37 (b) (iii), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1958).
19 By

reason of Rule 34, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1958).
district court suspended operation of its dismissal for three months. Societe
Internationale v. McGranery, note 1 supra, at 445. The court of appeals affirmed, but
allowed six more months of grace. Societe Internationale v. Brownell, (D.C. Cir. 1955)
225 F. (2d) 532. In August 1956, the district court denied plaintiff's motion to vacate
dismissal, and the court of appeals reaffirmed at 243 F. (2d) 254 (1957).
21 Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
22 "Rule 37 should not be construed to authorize dismissal of this complaint because
of petitioner's noncompliance with a pretrial production order when it has been established
that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not willfulness, bad faith, or any fault
of petitioner." Societe Internationale v. Rogers, id. at 212.
23 Of May 25, 1946. For text see 14 DEPT. OF STATE BuL. 1121-1124 (1946).
24 Art. IV (1), U.S.-Swiss Washington Accord, 14 DEPT. OF STATE BuL. 1121-1124 (1946).
25 The remainder of this paragraph is based upon the principal case at 17-19.
20 The
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nulled blocking of Interhandel's Swiss assets, which had been provisionally
blocked since 1945. In a note of May 4, 1948, to the State Department,
Switzerland contended that her Review Authority's decision made the
question of the nationality of Interhandel's ownership res judicata, by
reason of the Accord, vis-a-vis the United States. The Department of State
reply of July 26, 1948, rejected this thesis. Switzerland persisted, and in
her note of September 7, 1948, requested arbitration under article VI of
the Accord.26 On October 12, 1948, the United States suggested that her
courts were open to non-enemy aliens seeking restitution of vested assets.
Correspondence was suspended until April 9, 1953, when Switzerland complained that litigation had reached a deadlock. Various notes were then
exchanged, culminating in the Swiss note of August 9, 1956, which again
proposed arbitration under the Washington Accord, or under the Arbitration Treaty of February 16, 1931.27 The United States rejected these proposals on January 11, 1957. In a memorandum appended to the United
States note the State Department recognized Switzerland's exhaustion of
local remedies, although the United States Supreme Court subsequently
granted certiorari.2s
On two important occasions, the instant case and the Case of Certain
Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway ),29 the I.C.J. has had before it a
party whose acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction was subject to an
automatic reservation. In both cases the majority of the court, prompted
perhaps by a notion of expediency,s 0 found it unnecessary to adjudicate
the validity of the reservation. Six permanent judges, however, have disagreed, and specifically addressed themselves to the subject.31 Five of the
six find the reservation invalid for three basic reasons: (1) inconsistency
with article 36, paragraph 6 of the Statute of the Court,32 because the
reserving state purportedly retains the right to "settle" particular jurisdic26 "In case differences of opinion arise with regard to the application or interpretation
of this Accord which cannot be settled in any other way, recourse shall be had to arbitration." U.S.-Swiss Washington Accord, 14 DEPT. OF STATE BuL. 1121-1124 (1946).
27 47 Stat. 1983 (1931), T.S. 844 (1931).
28 Societe Internationale v. Rogers, note 21 supra.
29 [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 9. The French Declaration, reserving "differences relating to
matters which are essentially within the national jurisdiction as understood by the Government of the French Republic," was withdrawn on July IO, 1959. For English text of the
new French Declaration, see ABA SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, REPORT ON THE SELF-JUDGING ASPEGr OF THE UNITED STATES' DOMESTIC JURISDICTION REsERVATION 80 (August 1959).
30 See suggestion by Boskey, PROC. CORNELL SECOND SUMMER CoNF. OF INT. LAw 33
(1958) that such practice is not unusual, citing Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 at
448 (1929).
31Armond-Ugon (Uruguay), principal case at 90; Guerrero (El Salvador, died 1958),
Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, note 29 supra, at 43; Klaestad (Norway), principal case
at 75; Lauterpacht (United Kingdom), Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, note 29 supra,
at 43, principal case at 95; Sir Percy Spender (Australia), principal case at 54. Judge Read
(Canada, term expired 1958) found the French reservation involved a good-faith determination and hence was not automatic. Case of Certain Nonvegian Loans, note 29 supra, at 94.
32 "6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter
shall be settled by the decision of the Court."
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tional disputes by its own decision, (2) fundamental inconsistency with the
article 36 (2) concept of jurisdiction "compulsory ipso facto and without
special agreement,"33 and (3) failure of the acceptance, including the
reservation, to constitute a legal obligation because the existence and extent of the obligation is dependent upon ad hoc unilateral determination by
the accepting government.34 One judge has attacked the validity of these
propositions on the basis of an implied requirement of good faith in invocation of automatic reservations, which would make them subject to
judicial review,3° but he seems clearly wrong insofar as the intent of the
United States Senate is concerned.36 The major difficulty, if any, seems
to be the relation between these reasons and a conclusion that the United
States' reservation is invalid. Although the United States' condition (b)
may be somewhat different from a reservation to an ordinary multilateral
treaty, it is clearly analogous. Based on the theory that a state cannot be
bound without its consent, according to the traditional view, a ratification
with reservation of a multilateral treaty is inoperative unless all parties to
the treaty accept such reservation. 37 Hence, the first of the above reasons
for invalidity has some precedent in international law. According to a
relatively recent position taken by the I.C.J., however, ratification with a
reservation which is compatible with the raison d'etre of the treaty may,
in some circumstances, be operative without subsequent universal consent.38
The second reason for invalidity would take automatic reservations to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the court out of any such special class. The last
reason is founded upon a conceptualistic notion of legal act, roughly analogous to the Anglo-American contract notion of illusory promise.
33 The text of art. 36 (2) is quoted in note 2 supra.
34 Lauterpacht bases this objection on a "generally recognized principle of law," presumably within art. 38 (c) of the Statute of the Court, which authorizes application by
the court of "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." Case of Certain
Nonvegian Loans, note 29 supra, at 49.
35 Armond-Ugon, principal case at 93-94.
36 See statements by Loftus Becker, Legal Adviser to the State Department, PRoc.
CORNELL SECOND Sm.rMER CONF. ON INT. LAw 144-147 (1958); Lauterpacht's historical
survey in the principal case at 107-111. See also Senator Connally's explanations of the
condition, which he introduced as an amendment, in 92 CoNG. REc. 10624, 10695 (1946).
37 See, e.g., statement of Adrian Fisher while Legal Adviser to the State Department,
Senate Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the
Genocide Convention, 81st Cong., 2d sess., p. 134 (1950); United Kingdom Memorandum
annexed to the September 20, 1950, Report of the Secretary-General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
No. A/1372 (1950).
38 ,Vllile accepting the principle of universal consent, the court noted that with
regard to the Genocide Convention the purpose of the General Assembly and adopting
states was that "as many States as possible should participate," and concluded that the
parties had therefore tacitly consented in advance to reservations which did not "frustrate
or impair, by means of unilateral decisions or particular agreements, the purpose and
raison d'etre of the convention." Advisory Opinion on Reservations, (1951) I.C.J. Rep. 15,
45 AM. J. INT. L. 579 (1951).
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An additional problem may center on the possible separability of adherence and condition (b). One judge,39 with an oblique reference to
American practice of attempting to institute actions against Communist
states concerning aerial incidents,4° concluded the United States intended
to make a valid adherence. Admitting some ambiguity in the American
position,41 it would seem that the intent of the United States Senate, which
originated the condition, was to accept compulsory jurisdiction only in
principle. This is consistent with the established Senate position of
giving only token acknowledgment to the notion of compulsory international adjudication while jealously guarding the prerogatives of the United
States.42 Nevertheless, it would be expedient, perhaps, for the court to
continue to avoid decision on this delicate question until absolutely necessary. Because of the condition of reciprocity built into I.C.J. compulsory
jurisdiction,43 any state against whom the United States attempted to bring
an action could take advantage of the unfortunate condition (b).44 Hence,
the conclusion of no jurisdiction could almost always be based on invocation of the condition, assuming, arguendo, the condition's validity. If
adherence is not judicially eliminated the repugnant condition may not,
in particular disputes, be invoked, and the court could possibly find the
question of validity moot by reason of jurisdiction based on implied consent.
It would seem that the only possible situation requiring adjudication of the
validity of the adherence would be an application to set aside a default
judgment. This seems unlikely.
One must finally decide whether the United States should withdraw
the "as determined by the United States" language of condition (b). In
particular the Senate seems to have been concerned with the possibility of
an adverse international decision on immigration, tariffs, or the. Panama
Canal.45 The American Bar Association Section of International and
Comparative Law has concluded that there is negligible risk of a present
holding that these areas are not essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of the United States as determined by international law.40 A non-automatic
39

Armond-Ugon, principal case at 93-94.

40 E.g., Case of the Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft of U.S.A. (U.S. v. Hungary),
[1954] I.C.J. Rep. 99; Aerial Incident of Oct. 7th, 1952 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), [1956] I.C.J. Rep.
9; Aerial Incident of March 10th, 1953 (U.S. v. Czechoslovakia), [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 6. In
each of these cases the court rejected the American action because the defendant had not
accepted compulsory jurisdiction.
41 In addition to the aerial cases, note 40 supra, see State of the Union Message, 40
DEPT. OF STATE BuL. 115 at 118 (1959); Becker, "Some Political Problems of the Legal
Adviser," 38 DEPT. OF STATE BuL. 832 (1958).
42 See note 36 supra•
. 43 See note 2 supra.
44 This is what happened to France in the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, note 29
supra.
45 See Senator Connally's remarks, 92 CoNG. REc. 10624 (1946). ·
40 ABA SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND CoMPARATIVE LAW, REPORT ON THE SELF-JUDGING
ASPECT OF THE UNITED STATES' DOMESTIC JUR.ISDICTION RESERVATION 43-44 (August 1959).
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reservation of domestic jurisdiction, although surplusage,47 would not be
objectionable. The present reservation, however, detracts from United
States leadership in advocating a world-wide rule of law. Further, it substantially detracts from the growth of such a system, 4 8 the alternative to
which would seem to be either non-settlement of disputes, or settlement by
force or threat of force. It also leaves the ever-increasing interests abroad
of both the United States Government and United States nationals subject
to the risk that a foreign government will, by reciprocal use of the reservation, evade what otherwise would have been an obligation to adjudicate
a perfectly valid American claim. Of course the problem is difficult: at
bottom seems to lie the irreconcilability of advocating law while firmly
resolved to protect, regardless of illegality, what are thought to be vital national interests. In this regard, aside from the moral question, it might be
well to observe that the United States already holds the right to veto Security
Council enforcement of an adverse judgment.4 0
Robert Jillson

47 In the following seven international court decisions the court has recognized its
lack of jurisdiction over matters exclusively domestic: Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees
(Advisory Opinion), P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 4 (1923); Treatment of Polish Nationals in
Danzig (Advisory Opinion), P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 44 (1932); The Losinger, P.C.I.J., Ser.
A/B, No. 67 (1936); Electricity Co. of Sofia and Bulgaria, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 77 (1939);
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 89; Right of Passage over Indian Territory,
[1957] I.C.J. Rep. 6; and Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and
Rumania (First Phase, Advisory Opinion), [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 229. In all cases except
the last, where "essentially" was used, it was asserted that the matters were "exclusively"
domestic. Based on a study of these cases, Briggs, "The U.S. and the I.C.J.: a Re-Examination," 53 AM. J. INT. L. 301 at 304-305 (1959), concluded: (I) within this context the court
finds no significant difference between "exclusively" and "essentially"; (2) whether a
matter is exclusively within domestic jurisdicion is a question of international law; (3)
disputes are not exclusively domestic if they "arose out of matters which were governed
by treaty or other principles of international law and determination of the rights of the
parties involved an examination of their obligations under international law"; (4) when
confronted with a plea of domestic jurisdiction the court proceeds to determine its competence, and (5) if incompetent, refrains from rendering a decision on the merits.
48 The following states have accepted American leadership in reserving to themselves
the right to decide whether a particular reservation is applicable to a given dispute: India
(1956, acceptance of jurisdiction withdrawn 1957), Mexico (1957), France (1949, reservation withdrawn 1959), Liberia (1952), Union of South Africa (1955), Pakistan (1957), The
Sudan (1958) and the United Kingdom (1957, reservation withdrawn 1958). ABA SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, REPORT ON THE SELF-JUDGING AsPECT OF
THE UNITED STATES' DOMESTIC JURISDICTION REsERVATION 22-23 (August 1959).
49 "2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under
a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security
Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment." CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Art. 94.
(Emphasis supplied.) Art. 23 (1) provides that the United States shall be a permanent
member of the Security Council. Art. 27 (3) provides, inter alia, that on all matters not
procedural Security Council decisions "shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members." (Emphasis supplied.)

